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MIGRATORY ALBIONY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMLA N THE EXERCISE OF IN
PERSONAMI JURISDICTION
WILFRED J. RITZ--
Obstacles to obtaining binding determinations of domnicile often bloch the
personal jurisdiction required for alimiony adjudication. A way out of the
impasse, Professor Ritz argues, is offered by the mnechanism of rcmovlng
cases to federal courts under the constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship.
TI E entry of a judgment by a state court against a defendant who
fails to make a general appearance presents this question: Does the
state have a sufficient connection with the subject under consideration
and the persons involved to give it jurisdiction under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment?' An alimony judgment either im-
poses a personal duty on a defendant-husband to pay money to a former
wife or declares that he is under no duty to do so." It is a personal judg-
ment,3 within the principle of Pennoyr v. Neff; 1 and void unless there is
personal jurisdiction over the party against whom it is entered.5 For the
parties involved, alimony litigation is one aspect of the larger family
problem that includes marriage and divorce and may include the custody
of children. For society, alimony litigation presents an aspect of the
problem of family stability and security. Consequently, alimony litiga-
tion raises problems of in personam jurisdiction which, though not
unique, are disclosed with unusual clarity.
Migratory divorce has long been a familiar feature of the American
scene. In recent years, its corollary, migratory alimony, has become in-
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 42 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
2. This is an over-simplified definition of alimony. Alimony can be awvardcd with
or without a divorce, before or after a divorce, in money or property, in periedic or lump
sum payments, and to husband or wife. The nature of alimony varies from state to ctate.
Up to now, opinions of the United States Supreme Court have ignored many facets of
state domestic relations laws on the subject. The opinions treat alimony and the wife's
right to support as though they were hard, fast, immutable concepts, as prc&l3y dfined
everywhere as a debtor's obligation to repay a loan to his creditor.
Although a precise definition of the term is unnecesary for the purposc3 of this paper,
it will be used herein to mean, unless otherwise indicated, periodic money pa mcnts by
a former husband to his former wife under a decree entered in connection with or after an
absolute divorce proceeding. At this point, however, it should be noted that the
alimony involved in the principal cases under discussion was not of this typ.
3. Restatement, Judgments, ch. 1, Introductory Note (1942).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1373).
5. Restatement, Judgments § 14 (1942).
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creasingly significant. In Armstrong v. Armstrong,' decided in 1956, the
United States Supreme Court surveyed the field of migratory alimony
and temporized. Shortly thereafter, in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,7 the
Court took the path suggested by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Black in Armstrong. When the Armstrong-Vanderbilt8 judicial route,
which has now been taken to resolve migratory alimony problems, is con-
sidered in relation to other decisions of the Supreme Court, a constitu-
tional dilemma appears.
For more than a quarter century, the Supreme Court has generally
sanctioned an expanding concept of the reach of a state's jurisdiction
over nonresidents. Such landmark cases as Hess v. PawloskPo and Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington' require no discussion. Contrary to this
general trend, however, the power of the states to exercise jurisdiction in
the area of family law has actually been restricted and curtailed. Wil-
liams v. North Carolina" held that the exercise of jurisdiction by a
Nevada court over the marital status of nonresidents was not entitled to
full faith and credit. Since then, the same state twice has been denied
the power, in valid divorce proceedings, to cut off the alimony claims of
nonresident wives. In Estin v. Estin, 2 the support rights had been em-
bodied previously in a New York court decree; in Vanderbilt v. Vander-
bilt,'3 the claim to alimony had not been adjudicated previously. In
May v. Anderson,4 Wisconsin was denied the power to exercise juris-
diction over a nonresident mother's claim to the custody of her children.
Alimony litigation is the crossroads, so to speak, where the general
trend of an expanding concept of jurisdiction, as exemplified by decisions
such as International Shoe, meets a contracting concept of jurisdiction
in family law, as exemplified by Armstrong-Vanderbilt. The common
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is "domicile," one of the bases of a
6. 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
7. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
8. This expression will be used herein to refer to the views of Mr. Justice Black,
enunciated in his Armstrong concurrence and his opinion for the Court in Vanderbilt, as
applied to the factual situation presented in Armstrong.
9. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). This is the second case of the same name. The first was
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). These decisions will hereinafter be
referred to as I and II. See note 19 infra. See also Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith,
349 U.S. 1 (1955), where the Court found that Congress had not given to the Virgin
Islands any power to exercise jurisdiction over the marital status of a nonresident couple,
both of whom had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands.
12. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
13. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
14. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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general in personam jurisdiction13 and the usual basis in family law
cases.
The constitutional dilemma revealed in migratory alimony litigation
relates to the source from which are derived the definitions, in this in-
stance domicile, for the basis of the exercise of jurisdiction under the
federal constitution. There are two possibilities: (1) The definition of
domicile could be derived from state law, which means that it may vary
from state to state, or (2) the definition could be derived from federal
constitutional law, which means, in the final analysis, that the Supreme
Court defines the term and supervises its application.
These are the two horns of the dilemma: (1) If state law, under which
definitions vary, is employed to define domicile, due process of law will
depend upon which state judgment is before the Supreme Court, rather
than upon some overriding constitutional principle applicable to every
case. If this situation is to be avoided by giving controlling weight to
the determination of domicile in a contested proceeding over a contrary
finding in an uncontested proceeding, then due process will depend upon
the contest, and the usefulness of domicile as a basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction will be considerably limited. (2) If the definition of domicile
is found in federal constitutional law, which is ultimately fashioned and
applied by the Supreme Court, then the nation's highest court will be-
come a Supreme Court of Probate and Divorce.'0 If this situation is
avoided by distinguishing between the validity of a judgment in the state
where rendered, when the due process clause applies, and recognition
of the judgment in other states, when the full faith and credit clause
is involved, the utility of the latter clause will have been seriously
impaired.
In order to support these propositions, the relevant features of the
four principal cases leading into the problem will be stated briefly, fol-
lowed by a clarification of the two horns of the dilemma. Finally, con-
sideration will be given to two available escape routes, with a recom-
mendation made as to the one which should be taken.
I. THE CASES
A. Miiiken v. McycrV7
Milliken sued Meyer in a Wyoming court. Meyer was personally
served in Colorado, in accordance with Wyoming statutes. He made no
appearance in the Wyoming cause, and an in personam default judgment
15. See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 79 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956);
Restatement, Judgments § 16 (1942); Restatement, Conflict of Lavs § 79 (1934).
16. See Williams v. North Carolina I, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945).
17. 311 U.S. 457 (1940), reversing 105 Colo. 532, 100 P.2d 151 (1940), 101 Colo. 64,
76 P.2d 420 (193S).
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was entered against him. Subsequently, in a Colorado court, Meyer
sought to restrain Milliken from enforcing his Wyoming judgment. Meyer
claimed that he was a resident of Colorado, not Wyoming, at the time
of service. Nevertheless, the Colorado trial court found him to be domi-
ciled in Wyoming when suit was commenced in that state, thereby giving
Wyoming jurisdiction over his person. On the basis of this finding, the
trial court dismissed the bill. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed
and held, without passing on the question of Wyoming's jurisdiction over
the parties, that the judgment of Wyoming was void because of an irrec-
oncilable contradiction between the findings and the decree.
Responding to Milliken's claim that Colorado had denied full faith
and credit to the Wyoming judgment, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Reversing the Colorado judgment, the Court noted
that the Wyoming judgment was not void if rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over Meyer. Obviously, Wyoming had treated Meyer as its
domiciliary. Further, the Colorado trial court also had found him to be a
domiciliary of Wyoming, and this finding was not impaired in the state's
highest court. Therefore, Wyoming did have in personam jurisdiction
over Meyer, since, as the Supreme Court said, "domicile in the state is
alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the
state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of
appropriate substituted service."' 8
It is important to note that in Milliken v. Meyer the findings of domi-
cile were consistent. Both Wyoming and Colorado reached the same
conclusion, namely, that Meyer was domiciled in Wyoming. Therefore,
according to the findings of both states, Wyoming had the power to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over him.
B. Williams v. North Carolina"9
Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix left their North Carolina homes and
went to Nevada where, in accordance with Nevada law, they obtained
ex parte divorces from their respective stay-at-home spouses. They im-
mediately married and returned to North Carolina. Subsequently, North
Carolina prosecuted and convicted them of bigamous cohabitation, re-
fusing to recognize their Nevada divorces. In Williams v. North Carolina
I, the United States Supreme Court reversed these convictions, holding
that North Carolina was required to give full faith and credit to the
Nevada decrees provided the parties had acquired bona fide domiciles
18. 311 U.S. at 462.
19. Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), affirming 224 N.C. 183, 29
S.E.2d 744 (1944). Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), reversing 220
N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941).
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there.'0 On remand, the state again tried and convicted the pair of
bigamous cohabitation, the jury finding as a fact that they had not
acquired bona fide domiciles in Nevada. In Williams v. North Carolina
11, the Supreme Court affirmed these convictions, declaring that North
Carolina was not bound by the Nevada findings of domicile in ex parte
proceedings and that North Carolina could re-examine the question and
make a contrary finding of fact. If North Carolina found that Mr. Wil-
liams and Mrs. Hendrix had not acquired bona fide domiciles in Nevada,
then it was not required to recognize the Nevada divorces.
This paper is concerned primarily with two aspects of the Williams
litigation:
(1) After speaking of the duties of the Court with respect to the full
faith and credit clause, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made the following
statement in Williams 1I:
But the discharge of this duty does not make of this Court a court of probate
and divorce. Neither a rational system of law nor hard practicality calls for our
independent determination, in reviewing the judgment of a State court, of that rather
elusive relation between person and place which establishes domicile. "It is not for
us to retry the facts," as was held in a case in which, lie the present, the jurisdiction
underlying a sister-State judgment was dependent on domicil. 2
The Supreme Court did not formulate any standards for choosing be-
tween conflicting determinations of domicile by the states, nor did it
offer a definition of domicile that would be binding on all states for
jurisdictional purposes.
(2) The Court did not pass upon or decide whether the Williams
divorce was valid in Nevada itself,22 or in states other than North Caro-
lina and Nevada,' or even in other litigation in North Carolina itselfF2
20. For a direct result of this holding, compare Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 113
(1934), with Restatement of the Law, 1943 Supplement, Conflict of Laws § 113 (1949).
21. 325 U.S. at 233.
22. See Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 5S Harv. L. Rev. 930 (1945); Rheinstein,
The Constitutional Bases of jurisdiction, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 821-24 (1955).
23. One court thought this question was presented. Sutton v. Leib, 103 F2d 7t0 (7th
Cir. 1951). However, the Supreme Court's disposition of the cas a shows that the doctrine
of Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 303 U.S. 66 (1939), provides the basis for decision,
and so the question could not be reached. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
24. The Williams litigation involved a criminal prosecution by North Carolina. Since
the first Mrs. Williams and Mr. Hendrix were not parties to the litigation, thcy could
not be bound by the proceeding. See Restatement, Judgments § 93 (1942). In litigation
in North Carolina between Mr. Williams and the first Mrs. Williams, it is at least
debatable whether either party would be bound by the outcome of the criminal prw:ccution
against Mr. Williams.
19601
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C. Armstrong v. Armstrong2
The Armstrongs lived in Florida from the early 1920's until 1950,
when the wife left their Miami home and returned to their native state,
Ohio. In 1951, the husband filed suit for divorce in Florida. Service by
publication was made on Mrs. Armstrong, who actually knew of the
suit but did not appear in the proceeding. A divorce was granted to the
husband.
In 1952, Mrs. Armstrong filed suit for divorce and alimony in Ohio,
claiming that the Florida divorce had been obtained by fraud and mis-
representation. Mr. Armstrong appeared and answered. The Ohio court
refused to grant a divorce on the ground that the Florida decree was
conclusive; however, alimony was awarded to Mrs. Armstrong. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Mr. Armstrong's claim
that Ohio had denied full faith and credit to that part of the Florida
decree which had denied alimony to his former wife.
The Florida court's precise adjudication with respect to alimony pro-
vided the basis for the Supreme Court's disposition of the case. The
Court was unanimous in saying that the Ohio decision should be affirmed.
The Justices, however, differed in their reasons. Mr. Justice Minton,
speaking for four members of the Court, stated that Florida had not
purported to adjudicate the absent wife's right to alimony. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring, was sufficiently in accord with this construction
of the Florida decree to join therein, so that the opinion of Mr. Justice
Minton became the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for four Justices, declared that the Florida judgment was plainly a denial
of alimony on the merits.
Mr. Justice Black, therefore, reached the constitutional question of
whether Ohio had denied full faith and credit to a Florida judgment
denying alimony. He thought it had not, because "a State where one of
the parties to a marriage is domiciled can dissolve the marriage without
personal service but ... it cannot render a personal decree granting or
denying alimony."26
The husband, relying on Milliken v. Meyer, contended that personal
service on Mrs. Armstrong in Florida was unnecessary because she was
actually domiciled there at the time of the action. Justice Black answered
this argument thusly:
The Florida court did find she was domiciled there, but that was in an uncontested
proceeding. This finding was open to challenge in Ohio. . . .The issue was tried in
25. 350 U.S. 568 (1956), affirming 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954). This
proceeding originated in the Court of Common Pleas and was appealed to the Ohio
Court of Appeals, which affirmed. 99 Ohio App. 7, 130 N.E.2d 710 (1954). An appeal
to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed. 161 Ohio St. 390, 119 N.E.2d 72 (1954).
26. 350 U.S. at 578.
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Ohio with both parties present, and the trial court expressly found that Mrs.
Armstrong had returned to Ohio and was a "resident" there vithin the meaning of
the Ohio divorce statute at the time the Florida divorce proceedings were instituted.
. ..This statute has been uniformly interpreted by the Ohio courts to require
residence accompanied by an intention to make the State of Ohio a permanent
home. . . . We would accept the Ohio court's finding that Mrs. Armstrong vas
such a resident of Ohio when the Florida suit was brought as amply supported by
evidence in the record. Consequently the husband's reliance on Milliwen v. Meyer
is misplaced.27
D. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt23
The significance of Vanderbilt lies in the acceptance, at least by six
Justices," of the views expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Armstrong.
The Vanderbilts lived in California at the time Mrs. Vanderbilt moved
to New York. She took up residence there in February 1953. In March
1953, Mr. Vanderbilt filed suit for divorce in Nevada. Mrs. Vanderbilt
was not served in Nevada and did not appear in the proceeding. Mr.
Vanderbilt was granted a divorce, thereby ending his duty under Nevada
law to support his wife. Thereafter, the wife sought a decree of separa-
tion and alimony from a New York court, which, on the basis of a New
York statute, 0 entered a support order in favor of the wife. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed. Speaking for the Court, TMr. Justice
Black reiterated the views he had expressed in his concurring opinion
in Armstrong, that is to say, Nevada, not having personal jurisdiction
over the wife, could not terminate her right to support.
II. THE CONSTrrUTIONAL DiEmmA
A. The First Horn-Domicile Defined by State Law
1. Dzue Process Depends Upon Which State Judgment is Before the
Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Black said in Armstrong that he would accept
the Ohio finding of domicile in Ohio because it was "amply supported
by evidence in the record."31 When domicile is in issue, the evidence
may support findings of domicile in more than one state. Conflicting
conclusions as to the place of a person's domicile may be reached, either
because the states involved have different rules or because the courts,
using the same rules, draw different inferences from the same factsI
27. Ibid.
28. 354 U.S. 416 (1957), affirming 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N,.E2d 553, 153 X.Y.S2d 1
(1956), affirming 1 App. Div. 2d 3, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (lst Dep't), affirming 207 Mize. 291,
133 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
29. justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented. Mr. Chief Justice Warren did not
participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
30. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1170-b.
31. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
32. Restatement of the Law Continued, Conflict of Laws § 11, comment c (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954). A graphic example is found in the Dorrance litigation, wherein
19601
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This appears to have been the situation in Armstrong, where the evi-
dence would have supported findings that Mrs. Armstrong was domiciled
in either Florida or Ohio. Certainly, this was the situation if Florida was
still free to follow the rule that a married woman who wrongfully leaves
her husband cannot acquire a separate domicile."8 On the issue of fault,
the Ohio Court of Appeals indicated that the evidence introduced at the
trial would have supported a finding that either the husband or wife
had been "guilty of gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty .... M
In one sense, the issue in Armstrong went deeper than domicile. Marital
fault was involved. It was relevant not only to the question of Mrs.
Armstrong's domicile, but also to her very right to alimony. In Florida's
view, Mrs. Armstrong had no right to support because she had wrong-
fully left her husband." Ohio law is similar in that a wife who wrong-
fully leaves her husband generally is not entitled to alimony. 0 Therefore,
a finding that Mrs. Armstrong committed the marital wrong would
both Pennsylvania and New Jersey claimed Dorrance as a domiciliary. Compare In re
Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Ad. 303 (1932), with In re Dorrance's Estate, 115
N.J. Eq. 268, 170 At. 601 (Prerogative Ct. 1934).
33. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 577 (1956). The English rule precludes a
wife from acquiring a domicile separate from that of her husband. Attorney General
for Alberta v. Cook, [1926] A.C. 444 (Alberta). In 1913, the United States Supreme Court
carefully limited a holding that a married woman can have a domicile separate from
that of her husband to those situations in which she has "justifiably" left her husband.
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914). The original Restatement limited a wife's
power to acquire a separate domicile to situations where she lawfully lived apart from
her husband without being guilty of desertion under the law of their domicile at the
time of the separation. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 28 (1934). Under the current
revision, a wife can acquire a separate domicile in the same way as any other person.
Restatement of the Law Continued, Conflict of Laws § 28 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
One case has permitted a separate domicile where both parties were living together. Com-
monwealth v. Rutherfoord, 160 Va. 524, 169 S.E. 909 (1933).
34. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 Ohio App. 7, 10, 130 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1954).
35. The Florida court clearly found that Mrs. Armstrong was at fault since it awarded
the divorce to the husband and also stated that the wife "has not come into this court
in good faith or made any claim to the equitable conscience of the court. . . ." 350 U.S. at
569. In proper circumstances, Florida law does permit the award of alimony to a wife
against whom a divorce is decreed, unless the ground of divorce is adultery. Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 65.08 (Supp. 1959). See Brunner v. Brunner, 159 Fla. 762, 32 So. 2d 736 (1947),
rehearing denied, 160 Fla. 860, 36 So. 2d 827 (1948). See also Cowan v. Cowan, 147 Fla.
473, 2 So. 2d 869 (1941).
36. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.17 (Baldwin Supp. 1958) lists the grounds for alimony.
Since these are all based on the commission of a marital fault by the party ordered to
pay alimony, the concept of marital fault is the basis of a claim to alimony in Ohio.
Mrs. Armstrong commenced her Ohio action in 1952. The Ohio statutes had been amended
in 1951. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3105.18, 3105.20 (Baldwin Supp. 1958). As a result
of these amendments, Ohio will sometimes award alimony to a wife who has committed
a marital fault. De Milo v. Watson, 166 Ohio St. 433, 143 N.E.2d 707 (1957); Gage
v. Gage, 165 Ohio St. 462, 136 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
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probably bar her claim to alimony under the law of either state. A
Florida finding of fault which was binding on 'Mrs. Armstrong would bar
her claim to alimony under Ohio as well as Florida law. Such a Florida
finding would be binding if the Florida court had personal jurisdiction
over her.37 This leads back to the crucial question as to where she was
domiciled. Williams I, overruling Haddock v. Haddock, purported to
abolish marital fault as a jurisdictional fact. Mr. Justice Douglas stated
that "the question as to where the fault lies has no relevancy to the ex-
istence of state power . . . ." ' Yet, if the states are free to consider
marital fault when determining domicile, marital fault is still a juris-
dictional fact, albeit one step removed from where it was under Haddock
v. Haddock.
Suppose Mrs. Armstrong had appeared specially in the Florida pro-
ceeding in order to contest the issue of domicile and had lost. The Florida
court then entered a divorce decree in favor of her husband and denied
her alimony. Suppose further she had obtained review by the Supreme
Court, contending that Florida had lacked personal jurisdiction over her
and therefore had deprived her of due process.," Presumably, Mrs. Arm-
strono's contention would be rejected by the Court and the Florida
action affirmed. If Florida can consider marital fault when determining
domicile, the evidence in Armstrong would clearly support a finding that
Mrs. Armstrong retained a Florida domicile. After all, even Ohio ad-
mitted the evidence would support a finding that she committed a marital
wrong. Aside from marital fault, the evidence still seems to support a
finding that she was domiciled in Florida. If this is true, the courts of
Florida could acquire personal jurisdiction over her even while she was
outside the territorial limits of the state. Therefore, the Florida judg-
ment would not deprive Mrs. Armstrong of due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment.
In the actual litigation, Mrs. Armstrong did not appear in the Florida
proceeding to contest the issue of domicile. Mr. Justice Black said that
he would accept the Ohio court's finding that she was not domiciled in
Florida. Therefore, the Florida judgment did deprive her of due process
and was void."'
Thus, if the states are free to make conflicting determinations as to
37. Milliken v. Mleyer would require that Ohio give full faith and credit to the Florida
judgment. See Harding v. Harding, 193 U.S. 317 (1905). This is dearly Florida lav,
so far as further litigation in that state is concerned. Field v. Field, 91 So. 2d 640
(Fla. 1956) ; Anders v. Anders, 153 Fla. 54, 13 So. 2d 603 (1943).
38. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
39. Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 237, 300 (1942).
40. See the procedure followed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310
(1945).
41. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1957).
1960]
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where a person is domiciled, due process of law will depend upon which
state judgment is before the Supreme Court. If the Florida judgment is
reviewed directly, there is no denial of due process. If the Ohio judg-
ment which refuses to accord full faith and credit to the Florida judg-
ment is the subject of review, then the Florida judgment denies due
process.
2. Due Process Depends Upon a Contest. A defendant within the
territorial limits of a state can be personally served, his presence within
the state serving as a basis for jurisdiction. If the defendant is outside
the state, he may voluntarily appear, thereby giving the court jurisdic-
tion. Only when he is outside the state and refuses to come within its
territorial limits does domicile become important, because it may be the
only basis upon which jurisdiction can be exercised.
The value of Milliken v. Meyer lies in the power it gives a state to
bind an absent defendant who refuses to appear and contest the pro-
ceeding. Historically, as Mr. Chief Justice Stone pointed out in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington,42 the jurisdiction of a state to render
in personam judgments was grounded on a court's de facto power over
the person of the defendant.43 The Chief Justice continued:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."4
In Armstrong, Mr. Justice Black accepted the Ohio finding of domicile
over the contrary Florida finding because
the Florida court did find she was domiciled there, but that was in an uncontested
proceeding. This finding was open to challenge in Ohio .... The issue was tried in
Ohio with both parties present, and the trial court expressly found that Mrs.
Armstrong had returned to Ohio and was a "resident" there within the meaning
of the Ohio divorce statute at the time the Florida divorce proceedings were
instituted.45
There is an important distinction between the Williams and Armstrong
litigations which Mr. Justice Black either overlooked or ignored. In
Williams, the defendant-wife had never been domiciled in Nevada; in
Armstrong, the evidence was virtually conclusive that Mrs. Armstrong,
42. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
43. Id. at 316.
44. Ibid.
45. 350 U.S. at 578. The Justice never categorically states that Ohio found Mrs.
Armstrong to have been domiciled in Ohio when the Florida divorce proceeding was
instituted. He only says that Ohio found Mrs. Armstrong to be a "resident" and that the
Ohio divorce statute had been uniformly interpreted "to require residence accompanied
by an intention to make the State of Ohio a permanent home." Ibid.
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under any tenable test, had been domiciled in Florida. The basic question
in Armstrong, therefore, was whether 'rs. Armstrong was still domiciled
in Florida at the time her husband sued for divorce, or whether she had
changed her domicile to Ohio. If Irs. Armstrong were domiciled in
Florida at this critical time, then Florida would have personal juris-
diction over her, and matters litigated in that proceeding, under prin-
ciples of res judicata, would not be "open to challenge in Ohio."
Mr. Justice Black said that Mr. Armstrong's reliance on 3Iil~ilcn v.
2eyer was misplaced. Although the case was basic to the husband's
position, something the Supreme Court seems not to have fully appre-
ciated, it does not provide an answer to the Armstrong litigation, since
both Wyoming and Colorado had found that Meyer was domiciled in
Wyoming at the time of the proceeding there. Yet, it is also true that
Williams II, upon which Mr. Justice Black relied, does not provide the
answer, since both Nevada and North Carolina had taken for granted
that the defendant-wife was domiciled in North Carolina. In Armstrong,
unlike either of these cases, the two states made inconsistent findings as
to where the defendant-wife in the original divorce proceedings was
domiciled. Florida found that, at the time her husband sued for divorce,
Mrs. Armstrong was domiciled in that state, whereas Ohio found that
she was domiciled in Ohio.
Mr. Justice Black accepted the Ohio finding because it was made in a
proceeding "with both parties present," while the Florida finding was
made in "an uncontested proceeding." However, these findings are not
opposites as implied by Mr. justice Black. If the court has personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, then both parties are "present," even
though the defendant allows a default judgment to be entered aginst
him in an "uncontested" proceeding.
If it is the contest which makes conclusive the finding of domicile,
the appearance for the contest, and not the contest itself, will be of
primary significance. The defendant who appears to contest a court's
exercise of jurisdiction over him thereby subjects himself to that court's
jurisdiction, making the place of his domicile irrelevant. At any rate, it
is within the constitutional power of a state to have such a rule.""
Under the approach of Mr. justice Black, the defendant is encouraged
to postpone the contest until the lists are more to his liking. The contest
thereby gains new significance. The defendant runs the risk, it is true,
of being foreclosed on the merits. If he fails to appear and contest the
first proceeding, as in Milliken v. Meyer, he will be bound by the first
judgment, provided the finding of domicile by the second state is con-
46. See York v. Texas, 137 US. 15 (1SS0), which recognized the constitutional power
of Texas to abolish the special appearance. See also Johnson v. Di Giovanni, 347 Mich.
118, 7S N.W.2d 560 (1956); Burger v. Burger, 156 Tex. 524, 293 S.W2d 119 (1957).
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sistent with that of the first. Balanced against this risk, however, is the
possibility that only in the second state can he win on the merits. For
example, under present day domestic relations law the first state may
be one of those that does not award alimony in connection with absolute
divorce,47 or to the party against whom the divorce is granted.48 The
second state may permit an award of alimony under these circum-
stances.4" If the wife is at fault, or if her fault is fairly debatable, and
if she has an alternative, she certainly will not appear to contest either
the issue of domicile or of fault. So far as the plaintiff-husband is con-
cerned, he would like to revive and find a way to use the capias ad re-
spondendum so as to compel the contest in the forum of his choice.
If due process requires a contest in order to obtain a binding de-
termination of domicile, Milliken v. Meyer has been so limited that,
whenever the state of domicile is fairly debatable, domicile has become
an insubstantial basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.
B. The Second Horn-Domicile Defined by Federal Constitutional Law
1. A United States Supreme Court of Probate and Divorce. The cur-
rent revision of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws equivocates as
to the source of the definition of domicile, but it appears to accept a
constitutional concept. The black-letter rule of section 10, entitled "Dom-
icil by What Law Determined," is: "The forum uses its own rules of
domicil except when applying the Conflict of Laws rules of another
47. The general rule is that the power to grant permanent alimony in a divorce action
is entirely statutory. Nolen v. Nolen, 121 Fla. 130, 163 So. 401 (1935) ; Stanley v. Stanley,
226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946). Two states, because there is no statutory authority
for doing so, award no permanent alimony in connection with absolute divorce. Yow
v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89 S.E.2d 867 (1955); Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 187
Atl. 245 (1936). See Note, 31 N.C.L. Rev. 482 (1953).
48. The general view is that, in the absence of statutory authority, alimony cannot be
awarded to a wife against whom a divorce is granted. Quarles v. Quarles, 179 F.2d 57
(D.C. Cir. 1949); Lofvander v. Lofvander, 146 Mich. 370, 109 N.W. 662 (1906);
O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 12 N.J. 222, 96 At. 2d 410 (1953). Some state statutes expressly
prohibit the award of alimony to the defendant. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-826
(1955), which provides: "If the bonds of matrimony be dissolved at the suit of the
husband, the defendant shall not be entitled . . . to alimony." See Brown v. Brown, 198
Tenn. 600, 281 S.W.2d 492 (1955). Other state statutes have been similarly interpreted.
See, e.g., Luques v. Luques, 127 Me. 356, 143 Ad. 263 (1928); Gibson v. Gibson, 193
Ore. 139, 237 P.2d 498 (1951). Other statutes provide that only the party against whom
the decree is granted can be compelled to pay alimony. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 139.
49. Alimony statutes in some states have been construed to authorize the award of
permanent alimony to the wife against whom the divorce is granted. See, e.g., Dunham
v. Dunham, 244 Iowa 214, 56 N.W.2d 606 (1953); Graves v. Graves, 108 Mass. 314
(1871). In other states, the courts appear to have assumed this power without reference
to any particular statutory basis. Faxman v. Flaxman, 177 Okla. 28, 57 P.2d 819 (1936);
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951).
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state." ' However, comment b says the rule is "subject to constitutional
limitations." Comment e is as follows:
Effect of Constitution. Whether a State of the United States has juridiction
in a given case is a question of constitutional law. . . . Where such juri-diction
depends upon domicil, a State court's finding on this question is therefore subject
to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. If a case should arise where
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires that the law. of the State
of domicil be applied, a State court's finding on the question of domicil would like-
wise be subject to review by the Supreme Court.
Dissenting in Armnstrong, Mr. Justice Black lends support to the view
that the definition of domicile is to be found in federal constitutional
law. Referring to the Florida rule, he said, "The fiction that a woman
cannot have a separate 'domicile' from that of her husband is a relic of
the old discredited idea that women must always play a subordinate role
in society; it does not justify a departure from settled constitutional prin-
ciples.""al Such a criticism hardly comports with the Court's acceptance
of, and respect for, a controlling state law rule.
Although the subject is not discussed, it seems clear in the Supreme
Court opinions involving other bases of jurisdiction that a federal con-
stitutional rule or definition is being used. In McGee v. Intenational
Life Ins. Co., 5°2 the Court held that Texas was required to give full faith
and credit to a California in personam judgment entered against a foreign
corporation which, so far as the record indicated, never did business in
California, except for taking over a life insurance policy issued by an-
other company to a resident of California. The Court reaffirmed the rule
of International Shoe that the test of "due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in pcrsonam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 11Z3
Now, it seems obvious that the test of "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" is not a state law test. If it were, a bona fide
decision of a state court that its own exercise of jurisdiction did not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" would
end the matter and leave nothing for the Supreme Court to review. There
is a basis for Supreme Court review only if the Court is fashioning a rule
which is applicable to all states and which may be different from any
particular state's own notion of "fair play and substantial justice." It is,
50. Restatement of the Law Continued, Conflict of Laws § 10 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
51. 350 U.S. at 577. Page v. Page, 19 Alisc. 2d 291, 163 N.Y.S2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1957),
indicates that New York follows the Florida rule.
52. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
53. Id. at 222, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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therefore, implicit in both McGee and International Shoe that the rule
applied is a constitutional one and not derived from state law. 4
If the test of "doing business" is a constitutional rule," then is not the
test of domicile as a basis for exercising jurisdiction also a constitutional
one?
To give domicile a constitutional content different from the meaning
to be found in the varying rules of the states means an abandonment of
the approach set forth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams II, wherein
he declared that "neither a rational system of law nor hard practicality
calls for our independent determination, in reviewing the judgment of a
State court, of that rather elusive relation between person and place
which establishes domicil."", But then, after all, the concept of domicile
is no more elusive than that of "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." If jurisdiction in probate and divorce matters rests on
domicile, there is no escape from the nation's highest court becoming, as
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed it, a "court of probate and divorce. ' ,
2. Due Process Preserved and Full Faith and Credit Abandoned. The
Supreme Court avoided the task of defining and applying a constitutional
rule of domicile in Williams II by leaving uncertain the validity of the
Williams divorce in Nevada itself. Since the decision, arguments have
been advanced both for the validity and the invalidity of the divorce in
Nevada.
The argument that it was valid in Nevada is based on the proposition
crystallized by Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Yarboroitgh v. Yar-
borough:as
Between the prohibition of the due process clause, acting upon the courts of the
state from which such proceedings may be taken, and the mandate of the full faith
and credit clause, acting upon the state to which they may be taken, there is an
area which federal authority has not occupied.
Under this reasoning, a judgment may be valid where rendered because
due process has been complied with and yet not entitled to full faith and
54. In McGee, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals cited only cases from the United
States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). There is not the faintest
suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court that there could be a Texas rule, different
from the constitutional rule, of what constitutes "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
55. The basis for exercising jurisdiction may be differently phrased. The Court said
that the test of "doing business" had been accepted and abandoned in the evolution of
the standard used for measuring the extent of state judicial power over foreign corpora-
tions. "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had a substantial connection with that State [i.e., California]." 355 U.S. at 223.
56. 325 U.S. at 233.
57. Ibid.
58. 290 U.S. 202, 214 (1933).
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credit in another state which, for some policy reason, may wish to deny
such credit." As applied to the divorce field, this line of reasoning per-
mits what the Supreme Court in Willams I eschewed, a situation in
which a person is "a bigamist for living in one state with the only one
with whom the other state would permit him lawfully to live.c '
The argument that the Williams divorce was invalid in Nevada is
based on the proposition that due process and full faith and credit are
opposite sides of the same coin. A divorce valid where rendered is auto-
matically entitled to full faith and credit in other states. Since the Wil-
liams divorce was invalid in North Carolina, it must also have been
invalid in Nevada. A man cannot be divorced from a woman in one state
and still married to her in another.
Under a constitutional rule of domicile, the Williams divorce was in-
valid both in Nevada and in North Carolina. The Florida divorce decree
in Armstrong, which denied the wife alimony, was invalid both in Florida
and in Ohio. These decrees were invalid in the state of rendition because
the rendering courts did not have jurisdiction under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In each case, the non-appearing
party was not domiciled within the territorial jurisdiction of the state
rendering the judgment. The opinions of Mr. Justice Black in the Arm-
strong and Vazderbilt cases support these conclusions.
The same fundamental question is presented in Armstrong and Vander-
bilt as in Williams. Because personal judgments are involved in Armstrong
and Vanderbilt, these two cases make clear what was not clear in Wi-
liains II, which involved only marital status. The solution under which
a decree is valid where rendered and yet denied recognition in other
states is more illusory than real. The facade of due process is preserved
by abandoning the demands of full faith and credit. By the same logic,
the Washington judgment in International Shoe was not necessarily en-
titled to full faith and credit in Missouri. For sufficient policy reasons,
Missouri should be permitted to refuse to enforce the Washington judg-
ment. Further, the decision in McGee should have been to the contrary.
In truth, an in personam money judgment, whether for alimony or some-
thing else, which is valid where rendered but not entitled to recognition
in other states,"' is virtually a contradiction in terms. There is no reason
for treating divorce decrees differently.
59. For strong authority against this proposition, sea Fauntleroy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230
(19OS).
60. 317 U.S. at 300.
61. This assumes that the judgment has all the other characteristics, -uch as finality,
which must be present before it is entitled to out-of-state rccognition. See, e g., Barber
v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944).
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III. ESCAPE FROM CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. permits what Armstrong-Vander-
ilt denies in the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents. McGee ac-
cords to California a jurisdictional interest in an insurance company
which never did business there. Armstrong-Vanderbilt denies to Florida
a similar jurisdictional interest in the economic affairs of a married couple
who for a quarter of a century made their home in that stateY-'
If there is reason for taking different approaches to questions of status
in family law from problems in areas marked by arms-length dealing,
such as commercial law, 3 the reason does not apply to alimony litigation,
since it contains elements of both. Conceivably, a distinct alimony juris-
prudence could be developed, but the necessity for it is not apparent.
There are two other avenues of escape from the constitutional dilemma.
One leads to. the fragmentation of alimony litigation, while the other
leads to the settlement of all alimony questions in a single judicial pro-
ceeding.
A. Fragmentation of Alimony Litigation
Divorce and alimony do not present the first instance in which the
Supreme Court has found the concept of domicile difficult to manage.
A similar situation arose in the endeavor to apportion jurisdiction to tax
intangibles among the states. At first, the Court sought to allocate the
inheritance taxation of intangibles among the states on the basis of the
owner's domicile.' The effort began breaking down when the Court was
faced with difficult problems involving trusts,6 and was finally aban-
doned. 6
62. In McGee, Mr. justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court, looked at the history
of the exercise of jurisdiction since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and said:
"Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other
nonresidents." 355 U.S. at 222. In Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. at 576, the same
Justice, looking at the same history, had said: "Our view is based on the absence of
power in the Florida court to render a personal judgment against Mrs. Armstrong depriving
her of all right to alimony although she was a nonresident of Florida, had not been
personally served with process in that State, and had not appeared as a party. It has
been the constitutional rule in this country at least since Pennoyer v. Neff ...that non-
residents cannot be subjected to personal judgments without such service or appearance."
See also Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 608-09 (1958), where a comparison
is drawn between the McGee and Vanderbilt cases.
63. Cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 74 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 614 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
64. First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
65. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) ; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
66. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
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The present constitutional rule that domicile is a necessary jurisdic-
tional basis for divorce may also be on the road to oblivion. In Gran-
vilie-Smith v. Granvile-Smitlz, 7 the court temporized on the question of
whether domicile is necessary for the exercise of divorce jurisdiction by
a court having personal jurisdiction over both spouses.cs Three Justices
favored the abandonment of the rule.ca A state court, moreover, has flatly
denied its existence. 7°
As has already been done with respect to the taxation of intangibles,
and as may be in the offing for divorce, the Supreme Court could abandon
the present effort to allocate alimony litigation to a single state. This
development might be based on a synthesis of the viewpoints of Mr.
justice Frankfurter, concurring in Armstrong, and Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Vandrbilt.
The opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter looks to an allocation of
alimony litigation among the states on the basis of the situs of the prop-
erty which is the subject of controversy. The litigation in Armstrong
involved certificates of stock in the wife's possession, issued in the name
of the husband but not indorsed by him; jewelry in the wife's possession;
and money withdrawn by the wife from a joint bank account.-- Mr.
justice Frankfurter stated:
A study of the Florida decree . .. demonstrates, I believe, that Florida expressly
disavowed any adjudication regarding claims to and in property situated in Ohio, the
very properties which are the subject matter of the challenged Ohio decree.
Thus, the sole question that sunives is the power of Ohio, as a matter of its ovM
policy, to define rights in property situated in Ohio in the circumstances of this
case. A question of due process might be raised, though not successfully.72
Under this view, each state is accorded the power to adjudicate alimony
rights with respect to property within its own borders. When, as in
Armstrong, the subject of alimony litigation involves existing property,
this approach is possible, but it is plainly inadequate when the alimony
sought is of the more traditional type, i.e., an in personam obligation on
the part of the husband to make periodic money payments for an in-
definite period.
Under the approach of Mr. justice Harlan, dissenting in Vanderbilt,
alimony litigation would be allocated among the states on the basis of
the states' interest in alimony as an incident of the marital relation. Mr.
Justice Harlan says:
67. 349 U.S. 1 (1955). See note 11 supra.
6S. Here, the Vrrgin Islands was denied the power to exercif,2 a divorce jurisdction
on the basis of residence, specifically because Congress had not given this powcr to it.
69. Justices Clark, Black, and Reed.
70. Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1953).
71. 99 Ohio App. 7, 130 N.E2d 710 (1954).
72. 350 U.S. at 573-74.
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If it is due process for Nevada to adjudicate the marriage status of a domiciliary
without personal service over the absent spouse (as it clearly is, see Williams v
North Carolina, I ... ), I see no reason why Nevada cannot, at least for the purposes
of her own law, also adjudicate the incidents of that status. 73
Under this view, each state in which one of the spouses has been domi-
ciled during the existence of the marital relation has an alimony interest74
which that state would have the exclusive power of adjudicating for
purposes of its own law. 5
Thus, one escape route from the constitutional dilemma could be
taken by abandoning domicile as a jurisdictional basis for the exclusive
allocation of alimony jurisdiction among the states. As with the taxation
of intangibles, this abandonment is made easier by the fact that there is
no suggestion in the federal constitution that a state's power of adjudica-
tion for any purpose is based on domicile.
The implications of this escape route can be fully explored only in
connection with a comprehensive analysis of state laws on alimony.
Before this viewpoint is adopted, adequate consideration must be given
to the many problems arising from the varieties of alimony which exist
in the United States and the vagaries of state law on the subject. Some
consideration ought to be given to the nature of this right of a wife to
alimony. The Supreme Court opinions refer to it almost glibly. After all,
Armstrong and Vanderbilt did not involve husbands and wives. Under
these decisions, ex-husbands were compelled to support ex-wives. What
is the source, the rationale, and even the merit of the ex-husband's duty
to support his former wife? Even if these matters can be successfully
disposed of, the objection remains that this route leads to the fragmenta-
tion of alimony litigation, i.e., to a multiplicity of forums, of suits, and
of applicable laws.
73. 354 U.S. at 430.
74. It is not clear from Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion how many states might have an
alimony interest. He indicates that at least there is such an interest in the states of
domicile "at the time of the divorce." 354 U.S. at 430, 434. Even here there Is ambiguity,
since this may mean either when the suit is brought or when the decree is granted.
Further, if momentary domicile at the time of the divorce is sufficient to give the state
an alimony interest, it would seem that a "long-time" domicile prior to the time of divorce
would also be sufficient.
Actually, the view of Mr. Justice Harlan does not get beyond the threshold problem
in Armstrong, that is to say, where was Mrs. Armstrong domiciled at the time of the
divorce?
75. Mr. Justice Harlan accepts the view that a judgment may satisfy due process,
being valid where rendered, and yet not be entitled to full faith and credit in other
states. For development of this thesis he relies heavily on Powell, And Repent at Leisure,
58 Harv. L. Rev. 930 (1945).
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B. Unification of Alimony Litigation Thronglh Bizding
Domicile Deterninations
Although the federal constitution does not refer to domicile, it does
recognize "citizenship" as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the
federal courts. Article III gives the federal government jurisdiction over
controversies "between citizens of different States .... ,71 In the course
of time, the concepts of state citizenship and domicile have coalesced to
such a degree that state citizenship has come to mean state domicile.w-
Therefore, if Mrs. Armstrong was domiciled in Ohio, she was also a
citizen of Ohio. Mr. Armstrong was a domiciliary and a citizen of Flori-
da. Hence, there was a controversy respecting divorce and alimony
between citizens of different states, and so literally within the constitu-
tional jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Over a century ago the Supreme Court, in dictum, disclaimed "alto-
gether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the sub-
ject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony .... . In 1890, the
Court said, "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States."79 In De la Rarna v. De la Rama, 'j the Court
gave the following reasons for the supposed rule:
It has been a long established rule that the courts of the United States have no
jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either
as an original proceeding in chancery, or an incident of a divorce or separation.
both by reason of fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of
different States, so long as the marriage relation continue3 (a rule w.hich has been
somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for divorce
in itself involves no pecuniary value.8'
These are hardly valid reasons. An exclusive domestic relations juris-
diction is no more reserved to the states in the federal constitution than
is an exclusive jurisdiction over the ordinary tort or contract litigation
handled by the federal courts. 'Moreover, under Eric R.R. v. Tompkns,5 "
76. U.S. Const. art. MI, § 2.
77. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (18S9); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.
1954); BjornquisAt v. Boston & A.R.M-, 250 Fed. 929 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 573
(191S). See also Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § zo, comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1957).
78. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1,'59). This dimclaimer does not
extend to alimony judgments. The federal courts %-ill enforce an allowance for alimony
which has accrued as a debt. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952) ; Barber v. Barber, oupra;
Howard v. Jennings, 141 F.2d 193 (Sth Cir. 1944); Bosworth v. Bosworth, 118 F. Supp.
267 (D. La. 1954).
79. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 5S6, 593-94 (1890).
80. 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
81. Id. at 307.
82. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the federal courts would apply state and not federal law in diversity cases
involving domestic relations.
It was clearly recognized in Williamson v. Osenton,83 decided in 1913,
that, for purposes of maintaining a diversity action in the federal courts,
a married woman may have a domicile and, therefore, a state citizenship
which is separate and distinct from that of her husband. De la Rama
was decided seven years earlier. Even if there had been universal ac-
ceptance of the theory that the wife always must have the same domicile
as her husband, and the De la Rama opinion itself indicates the rule was
not so well established, the doctrine can no longer be accepted. In fact,
Mr. Justice Black believes the doctrine is based on a fiction and is a relic
of an old discredited idea.84
In alimony litigation, the amount in controversy frequently exceeds
$10,000.5 Hence, when alimony is claimed, the De la Rama objection
that a suit for divorce involves no pecuniary value is inapplicable. Fur-
ther, since the monetary jurisdictional requirement is only statutory and
not based upon the Constitution, it has nothing to do with the power of
the federal courts to exercise a jurisdiction authorized by Congress.
It seems evident, therefore, that the federal courts do have the consti-
tutional power to exercise a domestic relations jurisdiction in diversity
cases. It is only necessary, however, to recognize something in the nature
of a "fringe" jurisdiction in order to deal adequately with the specific
problem under consideration.
In the Armstrong situation, the constitutional dilemma in the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction arises because a state court, under present
law, cannot make a determination of domicile that conclusively binds a
party who does not appear. Such a conclusive determination could be
obtained under the following rule:
A party with actual notice of a state court proceeding in which his domicile is a
jurisdictional fact will be conclusively bound by the state court's determination of
this issue, unless the party by a special appearance removes the case to the federal
court on the ground of diversity of citizenship.8 6
This rule rests upon the recognition of the possibility that the federal
courts may exercise a domestic relations jurisdiction, rather than on any
requirement that they will or must do so.
Upon removal, the federal court will have personal jurisdiction over
both parties for the purpose of determining whether there is a diversity
of citizenship. This will require a determination as to the defendant's
83. 232 U.S. 619 (1914).
84. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958).
86. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Of course, it is assumed that the necessary judicial and
legislative steps will have been taken so that a party can follow the outlined procedure.
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domicile. The significant feature of the procedure is that the determina-
tion of the federal court will be conclusive and binding on both parties.
If the federal court decides that the defendant is a domiciliary of the
forum state, the case will be remanded to the state court.Y7 Ordinarily,
this will be done because diversity does not exist, since, in domestic
relations cases, the probabilities are that the plaintiff will also be a
domiciliary of the forum. If the plaintiff is not a domiciliary of the
forum, the case still will be remanded, since a defendant who is a citizen
of the forum state cannot remove the case to a federal court under the
present statutes However, the important fact is that the judgment
of the state court on remand will no longer be open to the Armstrong-
Vanderbilt objection that there was no in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant. The judgment of the federal court will be res judicata that
the state court did have personal jurisdiction, based on the defendant's
domicile within the forum state.
If the federal court finds that the defendant is not a domiciliary of the
forum state, the state court cannot exercise in personam jurisdiction over
him. There are then two possibilities, both depending upon whether the
federal courts exercise a domestic relations jurisdiction:
(1) If the present view is retained under which the federal courts re-
fuse jurisdiction over domestic relations cases, the case will be dismissed
on that ground. However, on the issue of diversity of citizenship, the case
will be within federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the judgment of the
federal court on this issue will bind both parties, that is to say, the fed-
eral court's determination that the defendant is not a domiciliary of the
forum state is conclusive. Thereafter, the state court cannot purport to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over him2P
(2) If the federal courts should recognize that their jurisdiction in
diversity cases extends to domestic relations just as to torts, contracts
and property, the case will be heard and decided along the lines of other
diversity litigation.
It is worth noting in this connection that section 1404(a) of Title 28
authorizes the transfer of a case to another federal district "where it
might have been brought." ° Under Williams I, a divorce action may be
instituted in the domiciliary state of either spouse. Hence, there is some
scope, once a domestic relations jurisdiction is recognized, for transfer
87. 2S U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1958).
SS. 2S U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1953).
89. A special appearance may be used to remove a case to a federal court without
submitting generally to thd jurisdiction of the state court. Cain v. Commerdal Publhing
Co., 232 U.S. 124 (1914); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 513 (1 95). See Develop-
ments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. S09, 992 (190).
90. 2S U.S.C. § 1404(a) (195S).
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under present legislation. Since alimony legislation requires in personam
jurisdiction over both parties, some cases could not be transferred under
present law. Even so, it is within the power of Congress to enact a
statute similar to interpleader, 9' under which process would run through-
out the nation in order that the most appropriate federal forum for
alimony litigation may be secured.
If it is preferable for state courts to decide domestic relations cases, a
procedure can be developed whereby these cases would be transferred
from one federal court to another and then remanded to the appropriate
state court of the latter federal district.
Application of this rule to the facts in Armstrong, as understood by
Mr. Justice Black, gives us the following results: Since Mrs. Armstrong,
with actual notice of the Florida proceeding, did not seek removal of the
case to the federal court, the determination of the Florida court that it
had in personam jurisdiction over her on grounds of domicile is res
judicata. The consequent Florida judgment denying alimony is entitled
to full faith and credit in Ohio. Therefore, Ohio cannot award alimony,
Mrs. Armstrong's claims having been litigated and decided against her
by a Florida court having personal jurisdiction over both parties.
If Mrs. Armstrong had removed the case to the appropriate Florida
federal court, that court would have decided whether she was domiciled
in Florida, and the judgment would have been conclusive. If she were
found to be a domiciliary of Florida, the case would have been remanded
to the Florida state court, and its adjudication would have been entitled
to full faith and credit. Subsequent proceedings in Ohio would be barred.
On the other hand, if she were found not to be a domiciliary of Florida, a
number of possibilities would be presented, depending upon the extent
to which a federal domestic relations jurisdiction is recognized. Under
present law, the case would be dismissed. This judgment would be res
judicata that Mrs. Armstrong was not domiciled in Florida and, there-
fore, that a Florida court could not exercise in personam jurisdiction
over her. Under the fourteenth amendment, Florida could not enter a
valid judgment concerning alimony. Thus, Ohio would be free to ad-
judicate her claim to alimony.
The need for a procedure giving binding and conclusive determina-
tions of domicile is clear. The mechanism of removal from state to fed-
eral courts under the constitutional grant of a federal jurisdiction in
diversity of citizenship cases offers a solution. Legal imagination exer-
cised by either the judiciary or by Congress, or both, to utilize this
procedure can resolve the constitutional dilemma in personal jurisdiction
which is made evident by litigation involving migratory alimony.
91. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958).
